



IMPLEMENTATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATIES AND STANDARDS (IMPACTS) GLOBAL PROJECT

Research on the Current Pay-scale of The Gambia

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CI	Corruption Index
EC	Employee's Compensation
GMB	The Gambia
GMD	Gambian Dalasi
GMS	The Gambia PayScale
FMOLS	Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System
NIS	PayScale of Nigeria
PMO	Personnel Management Office
SLS	Sierra Leone PayScale.

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Executive Summary

This research explores the remuneration pay scale of The Gambia government public service, focusing on the link between salary increment and corruption level. The results provide essential information on improving the government's remuneration policies regarding the salary for public servants to reduce the extent of corruption and bribery in the public service. The literature about the current issues will review various dimensions and aspects of institutional commitment showing readiness for a new revised PayScale. A theoretical foundation on the salary-corruption link will be provided, followed by an empirical application of the principles, econometric issues posed by the study, findings, and policy implications. The research will show that it is possible to establish a wage policy based on the concepts of qualification and fairness by assuming that civil officials are not simply interested in maximizing their salary.

This research paper also presents data on corruption and remuneration, as well as difficulties in determining relevant standards for comparison. Furthermore, even if an empirical link between remuneration and corruption is established, the direction of causality may remain ambiguous. Corruption may result in reduced compensation rather than higher pay because it reduces the public resources available to compensate public officials¹. An inefficient public service creates more opportunities for rent-seeking, bribery, extortion, and corruption. As such, some argue that higher pay may worsen corruption in certain circumstances by crowding out other funding required for quality service delivery, undermining the efficiency and productivity of public service delivery². There is widespread agreement that low government wages in developing countries reduce public sector efficiency and productivity while also providing incentives and opportunities for corruption and mismanagement of public resources. Most studies³, however, agree that raising wages without establishing effective control and monitoring systems, as well as enforcing appropriate sanctions, is unlikely to impact corruption. Salary levels in The Gambia civil sector are widely acknowledged to be too low. Salaries have not kept pace with rising costs. In the last two decades, there has only been two ten percent compensation raises across the board. The lowest classes can barely afford a sack of food with their monthly earnings. Grade 1 employees earn an average of 1,200 dalasis (US\$ 24) per month, or 1,500 dalasis (US\$30) with allowances, whereas a bag of rice costs roughly 1,600 dalasis (US\$ 30).

¹ https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Salary_top-ups_and_their_impact_on_corruption_2013.pdf

² World Bank (September 2020) Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency The Fight Against Corruption <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/235541600116631094/pdf/Enhancing-Government-Effectiveness-and-Transparency-The-Fight-Against-Corruption.pdf>

³ International Monetary Fund (IMF) . (2018). Review of 1997 guidance note on governance – A proposed framework for enhanced fund engagement <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/007/2018/022/article-A>
https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Salary_top-ups_and_their_impact_on_corruption_2013.pdf

Professional employees are quitting the government for various reasons, one of which is low pay. Compared to other low-income nations⁴ like Sierra Leone, civil service pay is modest; the average civil service salary in The Gambia is three times per capita income, compared to five times the Sub-Saharan average. By leaving the government, professional public officials can increase their salaries by ten to twenty times⁵ in the private sector. The salary compression ratio of 7.4 indicates that salaries are substantially compressed. When allowances are factored in, the ratio rises to 20, although this is because grades 1 and 12 have very low and high average compensation, respectively. Compared to grade 2, average compensation ratios range from 1 to 3, which is exceedingly low. Such percentages show that talented professionals have limited wage differentials, contributing to their high turnover rate. However, empirical evidence on the link between wages and corruption may be ambiguous due to methodological constraints involved in cross-country research of pay and corruption. Both have general measuring issues and restrictions.

Background

Can we be reasonably confident that public service reforms will be successfully implemented and sustained, even if there is a clear need? This isn't the first time the government of The Gambia has attempted to overhaul the public sector with the help of its donors. Many of the reforms addressed in this study have been tried before, but only a handful have been successful⁶. Unfortunately, civil service reform in The Gambia has a lengthy history of excellent intentions but little long-term effectiveness.

Underpaid employees develop various coping strategies to supplement their income, such as teaching, consulting for development organizations, or moonlighting in the private sector. Concentrating on activities that benefit from donor-funded *per diems* and allowances is one of the most common and effective strategies that most underpaid public officials capitalize on. Aside from the high risk of abuse, such practices have a number of unfavorable side effects, including distorting the incentive structure of public servants, encouraging specific forms of corruption and patronage, and creating situations conducive to conflicts of interest, competition for time, and brain drain.

The Gambia had a compact civil service with a decent level of capacity when it gained independence in 1965, albeit potentially understaffed. Its basic competence was maintained until at least the mid-1970s. Still, the trajectory has been largely downward due to over-expansion, patronage hirings, corruption, informality, and an outflow of professional and technical capabilities. In the 1980s, the authorities focused on decreasing and managing the size of the civil sector pay bill, aided by the World Bank's structural adjustment projects. Despite some initial success, the civil service's size gradually increased to pre-retrenchment levels, and the wage bill

⁴ For the 2022 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the [World Bank Atlas method](#), of \$1,045 or less in 2020

⁵ World Bank. 2010. The Gambia - Improving Civil Service Performance : Main Analysis. World Bank. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2848> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO

⁶ "Public Service Reform Sector Strategy Paper, 2007-11," PMO, August 2007

was further reduced, primarily due to deterioration in real wages. This made it difficult for the government to recruit and retain qualified public servants.

Various attempts to strengthen centralized human resource management and career development were also launched in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Personnel Management Office (PMO) was founded and given autonomy under the updated Public Service Act of 1991. The pay and grading structure was overhauled, with the salary grades reduced from 21 to 12. A staff inspection program and a performance-based staff appraisal system were devised to link compensation to performance. These instruments, however, were only partially implemented and did not last.⁷

The World Bank created a Sector Adjustment Loan (SECAL) in the first half of the 1990s to support civil service reforms aimed at enhancing governance. Still, the SECAL was derailed by the 1994 *coup d'etat* led by Yaya Jammeh and was never resurrected.⁸ Since then, authorities have primarily focused on increasing capacity in human resource accountancy, executive courses/leadership training, and financial health of the public sector, with donor-funded capacity building and sector reform programs assisting them. Although authorities and development partners continue to recognize the need for public service reform, there has yet to be a comprehensive solution.

Many different occupations within the civil service had to be compared, reviewed, and graded inside the same framework since the government opted to have a standard pay system⁹. The most important premise was to promote internal equity or equitable pay for equal-value work. At the time, aligning wages with the external market was not a major priority. Regular cost of living adjustments were to be used to preserve real pay levels.

The ideas that originally underpinned the civil service wage structure in The Gambia have gradually weakened over the past years. Despite repeated recommendations from the Salaries Commission, the government has not provided regular or adequate cost of living adjustments to compensate civil servants for inflation. As a result, real pay levels have fallen. Low pay has generated individual conduct such as lateness, corruption (i.e., taking kickbacks and bribery), and deliberate refusal to perform duties assigned seriously undermines public service efficiency and harms efforts to attract qualified workers. Staff members seek outside consulting services or personal businesses to supplement their monthly income. *Per diems* are aggressively pursued for externally supported courses and opportunities for certificated training, especially long-term postgraduate degree programs abroad.¹⁰ These opportunities are seen as appropriate compensation

⁷ World Bank, "Program Completion Report, Second Structural Adjustment Credit (Credit No. 2032-GM)," African Region, Report no. 12936, 7 April 1994

⁸ Pinto, Rogério, "Projectizing the governance approach to civil service reform," World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 252, 1994

⁹ 2021 is the latest development on the pay scale of The Gambia

¹⁰ This paper does not extensively examine the extent to which lower-, mid-, or high-level civil servants access these training opportunities

for low salaries. As a result, competent and experienced higher-level government officials are removed from their posts for extended periods, jeopardizing their departments' performance.

For several years, The Gambia's government had agreed that the country's civil service had several significant capacity gaps. The pay was insufficient to attract, retain, and encourage important technical and professional personnel. At the same time, employees were not managed to accomplish results, and neither good performance nor poor performance nor breaking the rules was rewarded or sanctioned.

Job security and institutional knowledge had been harmed by frequent dismissal and transfers of government personnel. Many employees were either unqualified for their jobs or had received no appropriate or hands-on training. In August 2007, the Personnel Management Office (PMO) drafted a reform strategy called the "Public Sector Reform Sector Strategy Paper 2007-2011." The Gambia government also introduced the "Civil Service Reform Programme 2018-2027" to restructure the public service for a more efficient and productive public service and better wages for public servants. As a result, the Personnel Management Office (PMO) was tasked to work on a job evaluation exercise, which led to developing a new standard grading scale. The government of The Gambia's cabinet approved the grading scale developed by the PMO in December 2021. The government of The Gambia established a task force comprising the PMO, Accountant General, and Ministry of Finance to work on the implementation of the new grading scale that was to come into effect by July 1, 2022. However, the new grading scale was never implemented, only for the government to announce a 30% salary increment for all government officials.

As a result, the current government PayScale/structure will be used in this study to compare it to regional public compensation standards.

Low compensation has also prompted departmental pressure to improve postings of public officials,¹¹ which PMO often complied with. Individual wages continue to rise without equivalent increases in job responsibilities due to "grade drift." Staff retention has been cited as a reason for this strategy. Internal wage structures have been twisted, and a "leapfrogging" mentality has emerged. The current situation is one in which the compensation structure is neither rational nor equal when it comes to rewarding individual job duties and performance. As a result of the pay disparity, some elements of the civil service have become projectized. The Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) team, for example, is primarily reliant on international consultants who are paid far more than domestic public servants through project money. Different project teams are compensated in other ways, such as through access to training opportunities, international travel, well-equipped offices, and project vehicle availability.

¹¹ In this context, civil servants are moved to larger/urban cities with better pay and without requisite change to their job role/responsibilities

Methodology

This project requires a methodological approach capable of accounting for a complex hybrid space, where interactions play out simultaneously both in the public sphere and behind closed doors.

The objectives of this chapter are three-fold. Building upon the literature and theory review, it first identifies significant research gaps and formulates research questions. Secondly, methods of analyzing data are elucidated, concluding with a discussion of the validity and reliability of the chosen method and approach ¹².

To attain the objectives of the study, various approaches will be employed. Primarily, we intend to:

1. Employ a dynamic long-run technique like the "Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) and the weighted pooled by Mark and Sul (2003) to establish the long-run implications of employee compensation on the level of corruption in The Gambia. As a single cointegrating vector, the FMOLS is used to estimate long-run relationships. The FMOLS modifies the least squares by considering the serial correlation and endogeneity effects in the regressors that emanate from the presence of the cointegrating relationship. Pedroni (2004) argues that the FMOLS is superior to the "Engle and Granger (EG) techniques"; hence it applies a suitable correction to solve the inference problems posed by the Engle Granger method." Furthermore, the FMOLS estimators correct the endogeneity problems and autocorrelation. Again, FMOLS is a nonparametric test that deals with the serial correlation (Pedroni 2000).

$$CI = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EM + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

Where; CI denotes corruption index, β_0 is the constant, β_1 denotes the coefficient of EM, EM is employees' compensation, and ε_t is the error term

The FMOLS estimator is as follows:

$$O_{FME} = \left(\sum_{t=2}^T Z_t Z_t' \right)^{-1} \left(\sum_{t=2}^T Z_t Y_t^+ - T \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{12}^+ \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) \quad (2)$$

The Y_t^+ and λ_{12}^+ terms in equation 2 help correct the endogeneity and autocorrelation. The FMOLS technique is "asymptotically unbiased" and permits for standard Wald analysis based on the chi-square statistical inference. This is possible because it possesses an efficient mixture of normal asymptotic distribution (Adom et al., 2015).

¹² Basic salary was used throughout the study

2. Utilize a comparative analysis to compare the current pay scale of The Gambia with two (2) West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) Member States¹³. The selection of the countries will be based on similarities in macroeconomic policies and structural realities, per their WAMZ membership, to determine whether civil servants are fairly compensated according to regional and international standards. As The Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria are all WAMZ members, all three countries must attain the same "WAMZ convergence"¹⁴ criteria¹⁵ ranging from monetary targeting¹⁶ to floating exchange rate regimes. Secondly, the United Nations ranked Sierra Leone and The Gambia within the same bracket as least developing countries based on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita, purchasing power parity, etc.¹⁷ Due to this economic trajectory, we deem it appropriate to compare The Gambia's PayScale with Sierra Leone. Furthermore, in 2002, Nigeria was considered one of the best within WAMZ in the manner in which civil service remuneration is structured¹⁸, thus we included it in the sample countries to determine whether The Gambia's civil servants are fairly compensated according to regional standards¹⁹.
3. Analyze the components of the current public sector pay scale of The Gambia against the cost-of-living index.

Data Collection

The sources of the data will allow a more detailed analysis of this paper:

Personal Management Office: The PMO is the main data source for this study. The research will collect data from the PMO on the current Gambia pay scale, benefits, and pay categories for public servants.

Secondary data: The research also collects data from a collation of published working papers and articles from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Labor Organization (ILO), The Gambia government websites, and the World Bank Development Indicators. This will help in the statistical/quantitative analysis of the study, including some comparison of other states and that of The Gambia.

¹³ The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), established in 2000, comprises six mainly English-speaking countries within ECOWAS (*The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone*) which plan to work towards adopting their own common currency, the **eco**

¹⁴ https://wami-imao.org/sites/default/files/2021_04/WAMI_OCCASIONAL_PAPER%2013_DEC_%202017.pdf

¹⁵ West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 2017 Vulnerability of WAMZ Member countries to External Shocks and Implication of Convergence Process

¹⁶ Monetary targeting (MT) is a simple rule for monetary policy according to which the central bank manages monetary aggregates as operating and/or intermediate target to influence the ultimate objective, price stability

¹⁷ <https://data.worldbank.org/country/XL>

¹⁸ This paper assumes that this ranking has not changed much, if at all, in the last 20 years

¹⁹ Nnanna, J. O. (2002). The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) convergence or divergence: which way forward. *Economic and Financial Review*

Questionnaires: Questionnaires were sent to 300 government workers²⁰ from the Ministries of Finance, Land, Basic and Secondary Education, Trade and Employment; Personnel Management Office; Central Bank of The Gambia; The Gambia Police; etc., to answer basic corruption perception random questions. A random sampling method was used through Google forms to select and collect data from respondents.

²⁰ The level/position of the respondents were not collected as part of the survey. This is one of the limitations of the study

Source of Data	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stable - can be reviewed repeatedly • Unobtrusive - not created as a result of the case study • Exact - contains exact names, references, and details of an event • Broad coverage - long span of time, many events and many settings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retrievability - can be low • Biased selectivity, if collection is incomplete • Reporting bias – reflects unknown bias of author • Access - may be deliberately blocked
Archival Records	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As for documentation • Precise and quantitative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accessibility - can be low for reasons of privacy
Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted – focuses directly on case study topic • Insightful– provides perceived causal inferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bias due to poorly constructed questions • Response bias • Inaccuracies due to poor recall • Reflexivity - interviewee says what interviewer wants to hear
Direct Observations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reality - covers events in real time • Contextual - covers context of Event 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time-consuming • Selectivity - unless broad coverage • Reflexivity - event may proceed differently because it is being observed • Cost - hours needed by human observers

Results and Findings

Relationship Between Salary and Corruption Index

Salaries may have an impact on the severity with which society polices corruption. Unreasonably low pay may encourage corruption and, in some cases, persuade society to condone such behavior. Governments can also impose penalties for certain degrees of corruption. If poor remuneration for civil officials encourages society to tolerate corruption, law enforcement cooperation will likely deteriorate, resulting in a decreased likelihood of detection and punishment of corruption. Civil servants may engage in satisficing rather than maximizing behavior (e.g., seeking good enough/adequate rewards versus seeking the largest possible/optimal returns). As a result, they may only be as corrupt as is required to obtain a 'fair wage.' In other words, even though it is not in their self-interest, government officials may readily forego possibilities for corruption if sufficient remunerations are paid.

Tables 1 and 2 represent the correlation matrix and Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square. The result from both Tables 1 and 2 showed a negative relationship between employee compensation and the corruption index in The Gambia. This implies that a 10 % increase in employee compensation will decrease corruption by 6%. This shows a significant relationship between employee compensation and corruption.

Table 1: correlation Matrix

Correlation			
Probability	CI	EC	
CI	1.000000		

EC	-0.550939	1.000000	
	0.0333	-----	

Note:²¹

²¹ CI denotes corruption index and EC is employee’s compensation

Table 2: Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
EC	-0.061775	0.021963	-2.812727	0.0157***
CI	2.690883	0.496497	5.419739	0.0002
R-squared	0.463836	Mean dependent var		1.318056
Adjusted R-squared	0.419156	S.D. dependent var		0.090606
S.E. of regression	0.069054	Sum squared residue		0.057221
Long-run variance	0.006258			

Note:²²

Comparative Analysis

Salary Comparative Analysis between The Gambia and Sierra Leone

This comparison is based on similarities of functions, titles, and requirements attached to the various salary grades. Moreover, the World Bank ranked Sierra Leone and The Gambia in the same basket as least developing countries based on macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita, purchasing power parity, etc. Similarly, both countries have similar structural realities; hence, they use monetary targeting and floating exchange rate regime as their frameworks.

The analysis in **table 3 and figures 1 and 2** represent the basic monthly pay scale of The Gambia and Sierra Leone from grades 1-12, using Gambian dalasi equivalents. The comparative analysis showed that a person employed at grade 1 in The Gambia earns GMD 1241.00 per month, while in Sierra Leone, it is at GMD 3346.94, which indicates the Sierra Leone pay scale at grade 1 is higher by GMD 2105.94 or 169.70%. Similarly, from grade 2-12 Sierra Leone's basic salary is higher than that of The Gambia by GMD 1,992.69 or 119.04%, 1,997.44 or 100.42%, 1,949.19 or 82.70%, 1,407.59 or 47.22%, 1,224.46 or 35.65%, 1,298.85 or 30.45%, 1,081.45 or 20.97%, 1,602.26 or 26.97%, 2,119.07 or 30.04%, 1,811.47 or 21.91% and 1,666.87 or 17.89% respectively.

The analysis in **figure 3** represents the salary inequality comparison between The Gambia and Sierra Leone, using the lowest (grade 1) and the highest (grade 12) paid employee index. The figure revealed that income inequality is higher in The Gambia compared to Sierra Leone. Thus, in The Gambia, a person employed in Grade 12 earns 651% more than a person in grade 1. Contrarily in Sierra Leone, the margin between grades 1 and 12 PayScale is 288%.

²² CI denotes corruption index and EC is employee's compensation, while *** represent 1% level of significant

Table 3: The Gambia and Sierra Leone Basic PayScale²³

Grades	GMS	SLS	GMD Differences	% Differences	salary inequality (1 and 12)
1	1241	3,346.94	2105.94	169.70	651% (GMS)
2	1674	3,666.69	1992.69	119.04	228% (SLS)
3	1989	3,986.44	1997.44	100.42	
4	2357	4,306.19	1949.19	82.70	
5	2981	4,388.59	1407.59	47.22	
6	3435	4,659.46	1224.46	35.65	
7	4266	5,564.85	1298.85	30.45	
8	5157	6,238.45	1081.45	20.97	
9	6104	7,706.26	1602.26	26.25	
10	7055	9,174.07	2119.07	30.04	
11	8268	10,079.47	1811.47	21.91	
12	9318	10,984.87	1666.87	17.89	

Note:²⁴




Figure 1: Salary Comparison

²³ Both scales have steps for each grade that are not included in this table.

²⁴ 1 GMD= L207.08 is use as exchange rate for the Leones This rate is based on the current market rate and was obtained from Bloomberg. GMS is The Gambia PayScale and SLS is Sierra Leone PayScale




Figure 2: GMS and SLS Salary Percentage Changes




Figure 3: Salary Inequality between The Gambia and Sierra Leone

Salary Comparative Analysis between The Gambia and Nigeria

The analysis in **table 4 and figures 4 and 5** represents the basic pay scale of The Gambia and Nigeria²⁵ from grades 1-12, using Gambian dalasi equivalents. The comparative analysis showed

²⁵ Nigeria has several grading scales at the federal level. For purposes of this study, the Consolidated Public Service Salary Structure (CONPSS), used for most ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) and last revised in 2019, was used. <https://nsiwc.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Consolidated-Public-Service-Salary-Structure-CONPSS.pdf>

that a person employed at grade 1 in The Gambia earns GMD 1241.00 per month, while in Nigeria is GMD 3,802.28, which indicates that Nigeria's pay scale at grade 1 is higher by GMD 2,561.28 or 206.39%. Similarly, from grade 2-12 Nigeria's basic salary is higher than that of The Gambia by GMD 2,163.43 or 129.24%, 1,878.45 or 94.44%, 1,616.32 or 68.58%, 1,185.65 or 39.77%, 1,311.82 or 38.19%, 2,473.89 or 57.99%, 3,286.40 or 63.73%, 3,707.80 or 60.74%, 4,149.40 or 58.82 and 3,585.70 or 38.48%, respectively. Furthermore, we also observed that Nigeria has three (3) more grades above The Gambia; therefore, the comparison was centered on grades 1-12.

The analysis in **figure 6** represents the salary inequality between The Gambia and Nigeria, using the lowest (grade 1) and the highest (grade 12) paid employee index. The outcome revealed that a person in grade 12 on the salary scale in The Gambia earns 651% more than a person in grade 1. Contrarily, in Nigeria, the margin is 278.4%. This implied that income inequality is higher in The Gambia compared to Nigeria. However, it is essential to note that when comparing Nigeria from grades 1-15, the inequality gap is up to 1225%.

Table 4: The Gambia and Nigeria Basic Salary Comparison

<i>Grades</i>	GMS	NIS	GMD Difference	% Differences	Salary Inequality
1	1241	3,802.28	2,561.28	206.39	651% (GMS)
2	1674	3,837.43	2,163.43	129.24	278.4% (NIS)
3	1989	3,867.45	1,878.45	94.44	1225% (NIS)
4	2357	3,973.32	1,616.32	68.58	
5	2981	4,166.65	1,185.65	39.77	
6	3435	4,746.82	1,311.82	38.19	
7	4266	6,739.89	2,473.89	57.99	
8	5157	8,443.40	3,286.40	63.73	
9	6104	9,811.80	3,707.80	60.74	
10	7055	11,204.40	4,149.40	58.82	

12	9318	12,903.70	3,585.70	38.48	
13		14,386.46			
14		15,876.10			
15		21,415.54			

Note:²⁶




Figure 4: GMS and NIS Dalasis Equivalents




Figure 5: GMS and NIS Salary Percentage Changes

²⁶ 1 GMD= N7.57 is use as exchange rate for the Naira. This rate is based on the current market rate and was obtained from Bloomberg GMS is The Gambia PayScale and NIS represent PayScale of Nigeria




Figure 6: Salary Inequality (%) between The Gambia and Nigeria

Salaries and Corruption Perception in The Gambia

Figure 7 showed that 88% of the respondents²⁷ are not satisfied with the current pay scale of The Gambia, and only 12% are satisfied with the current government pay scale due to the positions and benefits they are entitled to ranging from fuel coupons, per diems, allowances, etc.




Figure 7: Salary satisfaction

²⁷ A breakdown of participants is not available because this information was not captured

Furthermore, in **figure 8**, all the respondents believed that salary increment is capable of reducing the corruption level in The Gambia.




Figure 8: Salary Increment reduces Corruption in The Gambia

In **Figure 9**, the results revealed that 81% of the respondents stated that salary increment is the main action that can keep them from engaging in corrupt practices. In comparison, the remaining 19% highlighted that they do not engage in corrupt behavior due to other factors and not salary increments.




Figure 9: Motivation to stay out of Corruption

Conclusion

This study outlines the main attempt to comprehend the expected relationship between The Gambia government pay scale and corruption intent in the Gambian public sector. This notion has been given more solid validation and empirical evidence by using and gathering considerable data

that provides insightful information that leads to analytical tools and indications for the natural relationships between salary and corruption. The results of the data analysis and triangulation approach, which include reports, documents, and real-time comments, offer the article more scientific findings that low compensation is the primary motivator for corruption.

As a result, the fascination with low pay and corruption is always emphasized: "raise compensation can dissuade corruption."-Public employees will be tempted and terrified if they commit corruption while receiving a reasonable salary, when the danger is getting fired for this most secure and well-paying position.

The level/position of the respondents was not collected as part of the survey. This is one of the limitations of the study. This paper is one of the first pieces of research done to compare the pay scale/salary structure and corruption in The Gambia. Therefore, future research should capture the levels/positions of the respondents in their study.

Recommendations

Key Recommendations

1. The Gambia should review and augment the civil servants' compensation to align with standards used by other similar countries in the region.
2. The analysis shows that income inequality is higher in The Gambia compared to Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The study, therefore, recommends the government reduce this gap by adopting a pay scale with closer margins between the various salary grades.
3. To reduce corruption, the government should increase employee compensation, as evidenced by the FMOLS regression analysis. A 10% increase in employee compensation will lead to a decrease in corruption by 6%.

Recommended Short-Term Actions (within one year)

1. Raise employee compensation following the new PMO PayScale's recommendations and implement an automatic cost-of-living adjustment.
2. Create a special fund to offer market supplements²⁸ for scarce technical, professional, and management roles, which are particularly difficult to recruit and retain and are prone to brain drain up to the same pay level as subvented agencies. The fund should be utilized as a stopgap solution until regular salaries, and allowances align with those paid by subvented institutions.

²⁸ Market supplements are designed to support recruitment and retention of staff where there is objective evidence that the rate of pay offered is low

3. Create a detailed pension reform strategy based on the pension reform study's analysis. The study recommends a detailed study of the pension scheme. Paying more compensation means savings more for social security/pension.
4. Establish and sufficiently pay hardship allowances for critical staff from line departments, particularly Health and Education, deployed to rural / dangerous areas.
5. Develop transparent selection criteria for promotions and new appointments as a first step toward the medium-term construction of an effective performance rating system.
6. Limit fully funded government-sponsored training for public servants abroad and promote locally based training for a greater number of government officials to reduce government overhead costs.
7. Improve the collaboration between the PMO and Ministry of Finance to manage the wage bill.
8. Strengthen the PMO's core capabilities to position it for a more strategic role in the medium term.
9. Create a training policy for civil servants.

Recommended Short-Medium Term Actions (two to five years)

1. Create excellent performance appraisal tools and eliminate seniority as a criterion for advancement.
2. Update job descriptions, service schemes, and grading structures to reflect the new structures.
3. The percentage increment of public servants' compensation should not be across the board. The least paid staff should receive more percentage increment to their salaries than the well/moderately-well paid senior public servants.
4. Prior to any large-scale training, implement structural reforms. Otherwise, training may be ineffective and may increase recruitment and attrition issues.
5. Build local training capacity and commit more resources to on-the-job learning and locally oriented training in line with the civil service's "new look."
6. Strengthen the policy advisory capabilities of the President's and Secretary-General's offices.
7. In Education and Health, take a more planned and integrated approach to human resource management, particularly regarding regional staff deployment.
8. Revise existing laws so the PSC can have a more regulatory role and focus its recruitment role on senior staff.

9. Implement the pension reform approach proposed in year one.
10. Introduce KPIs as a tool to monitor staff performance in the public sector
11. Refocus the PMO's function on Human Resource HR policymaking and monitoring policy execution.

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Additional Readings

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<https://www.pmo.gov.gm/media-alert-payroll-update-exercise>

Appendix

Research Questionnaire Corruption perception in The Gambia

I am conducting research on the perception of corruption in The Gambia by government employees. The questionnaire is part of this procedure. Kindly provide answers to the questions below. promise to keep your identity strictly confidential. Thank you for your understanding and cooperation.

* Required

1. Department/Ministry who are working with? *

1. Are you satisfied with Gambia Government Pay scale? *

Yes
No

2. Can increase in salary reduce/decrease corruption in The Gambia? *

Yes
No

3. What motivate you to stay out of corruption *

Pay increment
Words of encouragement

